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Abstract
This paper investigates a new category of influential factors on business cycle synchro-
nization (BCS), so far hardly regarded in the BCS literature: It provides an empirical
assessment of the impact of macroeconomic imbalances, as monitored by the European
Commission by the scoreboard indicators since 2011, on BCS in the Euozone. We use
a quarterly data set covering the period 2002-2012 and estimate the direct and indirect
effects of macroeconomic imbalances in the pre- and post-crisis period in a simultane-
ous equations model. Business cycle correlation between EA members is measured by
the recently proposed dynamic conditional correlation of Engle (2002) which can better
identify synchronous and asynchronous behaviour of BC than the commonly used mea-
sures. We find that appearing differences between EA members in the current account,
in government deficit and public debt, in private debt and unit labor cost developments
have reduced BCS in the EA, even more in the post-crisis period than before. Moreover,
these explanatory factors of BCS, generally reinforce each other and are also influenced
by other critical macro imbalances. Since BCS is essential in a monetary union, this
paper provides clear support that a stronger, common economic governance would be
important for the functioning and survival of the Eurozone.
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1 Introduction
Since the introduction of the Euro in 1999, the degree of business cycle synchronization (BCS)
within the European Monetary Union (EMU) has varied substantially. EA business cycles
exhibit a stronger co-movement in the economic downturn but drift apart in the upswing.
According to Figure 1 which shows the correlation of business cycles in the EA, BCS was
relatively high during the economic stagnation in 2002-2003 and even more during the latest
global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. In contrast, business cycles in the EA
decoupled each time in the period following these downturns. After 2002/03 the periphery
countries experienced an extraordinary boom compared to the core countries. After the great
economic crisis the set in of the recovery varied widely, with the core recovering faster than
the periphery.
Figure 1: Development of business cycle correlation in the Euro Area
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The importance of business cycle synchronisation for the smooth operation of a common
currency area has been highlighted in the seminal works on optimum currency area (OCA)
theory (see, Kenen, 1969; McKinnon, 1963; Mundell, 1961), as well as, in more recent contri-
butions (see, for instance, Mundell, 1997; Frankel and Rose, 1998; Alesina et al., 2002). The
decoupling of EA business cycles has raised concerns whether the European Monetary Union
can function optimally (see, for instance, Kouparitsas, 1999; Agnello et al., 2013).
Macroeconomic imbalances are potentially important for business cycle synchronization.
Arising imbalances in one country are likely to lead to different output development in the
respective Euro country and thus to a decoupling in economic activity from the Eurozone.
The European Union, aiming to establish an early warning mechanism when a crisis in one
of its members builds up which could threaten the stability of the Euro, introduced the
surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances with EU regulation 1176/2011 in November 2011.
This procedure assesses macroeconomic imbalances on the basis of the so-called scoreboard
indicators which include: (i) the real effective exchange rate (which inside the Eurozone is
equivalent to the inflation differential), (ii) the nominal unit labor cost, (iii) the export market
share, (iv) the development of real housing prices, (v) the unemployment rate, (vi) the current
account balance, (vii) the net international investment position, (viii) private sector credit
flows and privat debt and (ix) public sector debt.
Indicators (i) and (ii) relate to the development of a country’s competitiveness. Its de-
terioration will reduce the export performance (indicator iii) which reduces output growth
and leads to a deterioration of the current account balance (indicator vi). Persistent current
account deficits need to be financed by international debt which worsens the international
investment position (indicator vii) and can lead to a worsening of financing conditions. Indi-
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cators (iv) and (v) reflect deviations of a country’s economic activity from the group which
makes a common monetary policy unsuitable for that country and may even aggravate it.
Indicators (vii), (viii) and (ix) relate to the financial stability of a country. Excessive accumu-
lation of debt in a EA member raise the interest level and may finally result in a debt crisis
which would be followed by a serious fall in economic activity. In summary, the appearance of
such macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone would indicate the risk that a EA member
drifts apart from the rest in economic activity. The further short and medium consequence
would be that BCS in the EA deteriorates.
How important are the phenomena addressed by the scoreboard indicators in fact for
business cycle synchronization in the Eurozone? Do differences in competitiveness among
Euro countries lead to current account imbalances and reduce BCS? To which extent do real
estate booms in one country or excessive unemployment problems decouple a country from
the Euro business cycle? To which extent does the accumulation of private or public debt in
a Euro country reduce its BC co-movement? This paper wishes to propose answers to these
important issues.
While the existing literature on BCS in the Eurozone has emphasized the contribution
of trade relations (Akin, 2012; Dées and Zorell, 2012; Duval et al., 2014; Imbs, 2004; Sied-
schlag and Tondl, 2011), elimination of exchange rate fluctuation (Akin, 2012; Böwer and
Guillemineau, 2006; Duarte et al., 2007), financial integration (Akin, 2012; Herrero and Ruiz,
2008; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013), sector specialization (Imbs, 2004; Herrero and Ruiz, 2008;
Siedschlag and Tondl, 2011; Akin, 2012; Dées and Zorell, 2012) and differentials in public
sector deficits (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Darvas et al., 2005;
Antonakakis and Tondl, 2014), hardly any of the existing studies, to our best knowledge, has
addressed the importance of the full set of macroeconomic imbalances as addressed by the
macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP) scoreboard indicators.1
We evaluate the effect of macroeconomic imbalances in a EA member and the consequently
arising imbalances across members in a model of simultaneous equations following Imbs (2004)
and Antonakakis and Tondl (2014). The model will focus on the effects on BCS arising from
the phenomena of (i) competitiveness and current account imbalances, (ii) imbalances in fiscal
deficits and public/private debt, (iii) imbalances in wage development, and (iv) decoupling (as
shown by housing prices and unemployment). Knowing about the role of these phenomena
on BCS will permit to judge the potential of the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances
to prevent decoupling of business cycles in the Eurozone. If we can detect a strong impact of
the scoreboard indicators, we will have supportive evidence for strengthening the role of the
EU in economic governance. The simultaneous equations model will permit us to account for
reverse causality between imbalances and BC correlation as well as for endogeneity between
macroeconomic imbalances indicators. In this way we will see the direct and indirect effect
of a scoreboard indicator on BCS. We will be able to understand the transmission channels
of such imbalances.
The investigation will cover the period 2002 - 2012 and distinguish further between the
pre-crisis period until the end of 2007 and the recession- and post-crisis period from 2008-
2012 accounting for the changing pattern of relationships between these distinct periods.
To measure BCS we will use the dynamic conditional correlation (Engle, 2002) proposed
recently in the BC literature (Antonakakis, 2012; Siklos, 2012). This approach takes into
account both time variation and conditional heterogeneity in business cycles correlations,
and thus has several advantages. First, it is able to identify negative correlations due to
episodes in single periods, synchronous behavior during stable periods and asynchronous
behavior in turbulent periods. Unlike rolling windows, the proposed measure does not suffer
1Exceptions are the studies of Inklaar et al. (2008) and Siklos (2012) that consider business cycle synchro-
nization determinants similar to some of the scoreboard indicators.
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from the so-called ghost feature, as the effects of a shock are not reflected in m consecutive
periods, with m being the window span. In addition, under the proposed measure there is
neither a need to set a window span, nor a loss of observations, nor is subsample estimation
required.
We find in our estimations that imbalances across EA members in current account bal-
ance, in government deficit, in public and private debt, and in the development of unit labor
costs have a decoupling effect on BCS in the EA which increased in the post-crisis period.
Moreover, these explanatory factors of BCS are mostly interlinked with each other in such a
way that they reinforce each other. Therefore, the Eurozone is advised to establish a political,
institutional framework that guarantees that in the key areas addressed by the scoreboard
indicators its members follow highly coordinated economic policies, guided by common eco-
nomic policy goals. Even more, our study provides clear support that the establishment of
strong, common economic governance in the Eurozone is imperative for the functioning and
survival of the European Monetary Union. However, in our estimations we also find that
there exists generally endogeneity between the regarded key scoreboard indicators and BCS.
If a coordinated economic governance in the Eurozone succeeds to achieve stronger BCS
this would subsequently make it more easy for EA members to agree on common economic
policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main hypotheses,
discusses empirical developments and relates to the existing literature. Section 3 presents
the model specification for the empirical estimation, section 4 the data set and employed
measures, section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Main Hypotheses, Empirical Developments and Relation to
Existing Literature
In this section, we set out our main hypotheses concerning the role of macroeconomic imbal-
ances between member states as determinants of business cycle (de-)synchronization in the
Euro Area and relate them to the existing literature. This discussion, is supplemented by a
short description of the actual developments of these determinants observed in our data set.
Hypothesis 1: Differences in current account balances between member states lead to lower
BCS in the Euro Area.
Disparities in the current account balance across countries refer to a situation where,
e.g., one country experiences a trade surplus and the other a trade deficit, or, where one
country experiences a large trade surplus and the other a small trade surplus. In such cases,
business cycles between these countries will decouple due to the fact that, e.g., the heavy
exporter country would enjoy additional domestic growth from export demand, while the high
import bill of the net importer will lead to lower domestic demand and thus lower economic
growth. However, the reason behind current account imbalances leading to lower BCS is not
only linked to demand effects. Current account imbalances could also lead to business cycle
de-synchronization through their effect on the net foreign investment position.
For instance, if a country registers a steady current account deficit this will raise its
international debt. This could lead to unsustainable foreign borrowing that raises borrowing
costs as lenders perceive that the risk of a debt default increases. The increasing financing
costs would dampen private investment and make government financing overly costly so that
fiscal adjustment will occur. This in turn will produce a contractive effect in the country
concerned and decouple it from the EA BC. Consequently, we see that current account
differences across EA members can threaten BCS via demand effects and financing effects.
Since this question has not yet been investigated in the literature our investigation will provide
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a first contribution on this issue. According to Figure 2, we can observe that differences in
current account positions across EA members have developed rather heterogeneously over
time. While the differential declined in successive steps since the euro came into circulation,
it followed a sharp increasing trend on the eve of the global financial crisis before starting to
decline again in 2010. The reason is that in the first half of the 2000s, current account deficits
improved in the EA periphery, but deteriorated slightly in some core members. On the eve
of the financial crisis, in contrast, current account deficits grew again in the EA periphery
while some core members, for example Germany, the Netherlands and Austria continuously
built up a current account surplus.
Figure 2: Development of differences in current account balance in the Euro Area
(average absolute difference between countries)
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Hypothesis 2: Differences in fiscal deficits between EA member states can either reduce or
strengthen their BCS.
Differences in fiscal deficits (the indicator is derived from countries primary government
deficits) have been constantly pronounced in the EA since a part of the members always
followed a more expansionary fiscal policy while others a more conservative. Only during
the sovereign debt crisis 2009/10 differences in fiscal deficits shortly dropped when all EA
members broke the excessive deficit rule and consequently had to consolidate their budgets
(see Figure 3). A country incurring a fiscal deficit will show higher government expenditures
than a country with a balanced budget. The extra government expenditures in the deficit
country will generate demand and consequently extra income growth. Thus, countries with
higher deficits will generate higher domestic output growth. Therefore, differences in fiscal
policies, either if one country has a high fiscal deficit while the other a modest, or if one
country has a fiscal surplus while the other a deficit, should reduce BCS. However, one has to
consider a second possibility. Since an active fiscal policy could also help to smooth business
cycles, i.e. neutralize a country-specific shock, differences in fiscal deficits could also enhance
BCS. Most of the empirical literature finds a decoupling effect of diverging fiscal policies (see,
for instance, Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Darvas et al., 2005; Crespo-Cuaresma et al.,
2011; Antonakakis and Tondl, 2014).
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Figure 3: Development of differences in government deficits in the Euro Area
(average absolute difference between countries)
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Hypothesis 3: Differences in public debt levels between EA members produce decoupling
effects on BCS.
Public debt differences have significantly increased in the EA in the pre-crisis period
and have grown slightly further in the crisis period (see Figure 4). Might this development
threaten BCS in the EA? First, disparities in public debt levels reflect differences in past fiscal
policies, but also different financing costs of debt. In the sense that the rapid accumulation
of public debt in an economy indicates highly expansionary fiscal policies that result in high
output growth in successive periods, mounting differences in government debt levels in the
EA should also be visible in output growth differences across the EA and thus reduced BCS.
Second, since excessive public debt levels will result in financial stress and soaring credit
costs, the resulting unsustainability and necessary efforts for budgetary consolidation would
reduce output in the respective country. Thus differences in public debt in the EA would
entail different needs for budgetary consolidation with different consequences on output and
finally result in less BCS. In the case of common budgetary consolidation –– irrelevant of
the debt level –– however, all economies would suffer a decline of output, manifesting in high
BCS. Third, high debt levels limit the ability for pro-active fiscal policies so that recessions
in high debt countries will be more severe (Checherita and Rother, 2012) and lead to less
BCS. Unlike the effects of divergence in government deficits on BCS, the long term effects of
public debt on BCS have practically not been evaluated in the literature.2
2Only Darvas et al. (2005) report to use public debt in a sensitivity analysis to confirm the negative
coefficient of budget deficit on BCS.
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Figure 4: Development of differences in government debt in the Euro Area
(average absolute difference between countries)
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Hypothesis 4: Differences in private debt levels in the EA lead to a divergence of BC.
Private sector debt differences have importantly increased in the pre-crisis period in the
EA (see Figure 5). The accumulation of private debt in a country enables higher private
demand expenditures and higher output growth in an initial period. Thus differences in
private debt accumulation in the EA should manifest in different growth performance and
reduced BCS. In a second stage, private debt levels may become unsustainable, as it happened
during the financial crisis. In economies with high private debt, insolvencies would increase,
leading to income loss, sudden drop in demand and contracting output. Particularly in
recession periods, the drop in output would be higher in countries with high private debt
(Randveer et al., 2012). Consequently, it can be assumed that differences in private sector
debt should have led to different output growth in the EU and to reduced BCS.
Figure 5: Development of differences in private sector debt in the Euro Area
(average absolute difference between countries)
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Hypothesis 5: Different developments in wages between EA members can improve or reduce
BCS.
Different wage developments will arise due to different output situations of economies
and will constitute an adjustment instrument, so that economies in a boom will watch an
increase of wages that slows down growth, and economies in a recession will watch a modest
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development of wages so that they will be able to recover in output growth. Thus different
wage developments may serve BCS. However, excessive wage demands or undue wage re-
strictions in a country and the ensuing immediate demand effects can lead to overheating of
the concerned economy and result in a reduction of BCS (Gächter et al., 2016). Since there
are no complete statistics on quarterly wage developments we focus on real unit labor cost
developments as a proxy. Real unit labor cost developments have seen mainly periods of dis-
similarity in the EA, interrupted by a short period of more similar developments during the
debt crisis (see Figure 6), as pointed out also in Estrada et al. (2013) and Felipe and Kumar
(2014). We will test whether different unit labor cost developments improve or reduce BCS
which hardly has been investigated in the literature, with the recent exception of Gächter
et al. (2016).
Figure 6: Differences in growth of labor unit costs in the Euro Area
(average absolute difference between countries)
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Besides the impact of the scoreboard indicators: current account, government deficit,
public debt, private debt and unit labor cost development, we will test the impact of additional
indicators of the scoreboard list within the auxiliary equations of our model and present
conjectures on their effect in the discussion of the model in the next section.
3 Model Specification
We build on Imbs (2004) and follow Antonakakis and Tondl (2014) and estimate a system
of simultaneous equations based on a panel data set which, however, is far more complex
than that in previous studies. The bilateral correlation of business cycles is explained by
five variables which are all considered to be endogenous, so that each is modeled within the
system separately. In this way we can examine a variety of diverse indirect effects, that have
been so far overlooked in the literature. Since each variable is itself explained by two to five
other endogenous variables plus exogenous variables, in this complexity, the variables are
very well defined. This is confirmed by a high explanatory power of the estimations, as we
shall see below.
We estimate the proposed effects in the following simultaneous equations model based on
a quarterly panel data set for EA 12 in the period 2002 to 2012.
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2CORijt = α0 + α1CAijt + α2GOVDEFijt + α3GOVDEBTijt +
+α4PRIV DEBTijt + α5∆LUNITijt + µ1ij + λ1t + ε1ijt (1)
CAijt = β0 + β1CORijt + β2GOVDEFijt + β3∆LUNITijt +
+β4∆EXRATEijt + β5CONSTRijt + β6CONSUMijt +
+µ2ij + λ2t + ε2ijt (2)
GOVDEFijt = γ0 + γ1GOVDEF_PAST1ijt + γ2CORijt + γ3POLIDEOijt +
+γ4POLBCijt + γ5INFLijt + γ6∆UNEMPLijt + γ7TAXijt +
γ8PRIV DEBTijt + µ3ij + λ3t + ε3ijt (3)
GOVDEBTijt = δ0 + δ1CORijt + δ2NETLEND_PAST3ijt + δ3BONDRATEijt +
+δ4PRIV DEBTijt + µ4ij + λ4t + ε4ijt (4)
PRIV DEBTijt = η0 + η1BONDRATEijt + η2INV_PAST2ijt + µ5ij + λ5t + ε5ijt (5)
LUNITijt = ζ0 + ζ1CAijt + ζ2CORijt + ζ3∆UNEMPLijt + ζ4∆TOT_L2ijt +
+ζ5∆HOUSEPRICEijt + µ6ij + λ6t + ε6ijt (6)
where i, j and t are the index country pairs (i, j) in period t, and ε is the error term. Each
equation includes a set of exogenous control variables employed in the system to achieve
identification and to minimize any potential omitted variables bias. µkij and λkt, where
k = 1, . . . , 5, are the country–pair fixed effects and time fixed effects, respectively.3
In the principal equation, Equation (1), CORijt is a dynamic conditional correlation
measure of business cycles4 between country i and j. The indicator will be explained in
detail in Section 4. CAijt denotes the current account deficit differential between a country
pair. GOVDEFijt is the primary deficit differential between two countries and can be seen as
an indicator of fiscal policy coordination. GOVDEBTijt is the government debt differential
between two countries. ∆LUNITijt refers to the differential of the change in real unit labor
costs and PRIV DEBTijt is the private debt differential.
In addition to the principal equation, Equation (1), the system consists of five auxiliary
equations which capture the simultaneity contained in Equation (1).
In Equation (2), the current account differential between a country pair is explained by
COR, the dynamic conditional correlation of business cycles, GOVDEF , the fiscal deficit
differential, ∆LUNIT , the differential of changes in real unit labor cost, and a set of ex-
ogenous variables, among them, the differential of the change in real effective exchange rate,
∆EXRATE, the differential of the share of construction in gross value added, CONSTR,
and the consumption propensity differential, CONSUM . This should permit us to find out
what are the causes of large differences in current account balances between EA countries.
We would expect the higher the differences are in COR, in fiscal spending, in unit labor
cost developments, in real exchange rate developments, in the share of construction and in
consumption propensity, the higher should be current account differentials between these
countries. On the contrary, if countries have similar real exchange rate developments or fiscal
deficits then we expect them to exhibit small differences in current account balances. Why?
3For the system to be identified it is necessary that for each endogenous variable in an equation, an equal
number of exogenous variables, differently from the exogenous used in another equation, is present. Thus each
equation requires a different set of exogenous variables (Wooldridge, 2006).
4The measure is taken from Engle (2002).
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Differences in the current account balance sheet should reflect different fiscal policies since
there is a direct relation between current account deficit and fiscal deficit accumulation as the
increased fiscal expenditures will increase imports and worsen the current account (Herrmann
and Jochem, 2005; Trachanas and Katrakilidis, 2013). Differences in the development of real
exchange rates and real unit labor costs lead to different levels of competitiveness between
countries and thus different export performance. This point was raised in the literature by
Estrada et al. (2013) who find that the accumulation of current account deficits is linked to
unit labor cost developments and Herrmann and Jochem (2005) and Brissimis et al. (2012)
who verify a negative effect of exchange rates movements on the current account balance.
Countries with a high consumption propensity and a large construction sector would have
a higher import share (Gehringer, 2013). Thus differences in consumption and construction
share should result in current account differences among EA members.
Equation (3) explains differences in primary fiscal deficits, GOVDEF ,5 between coun-
try pairs using past primary fiscal deficit differentials (average over the previous year),
GOVDEF_PAST1, differences in economic growth, COR, and a set of exogenous vari-
ables. Among them is the differential of an index of political ideology between two countries,
POL_IDEO, the differential in the political business cycles (measured by the number of
quarters to the next election), POL_BC, the inflation differential, INFL, the differential
between two countries in the change in unemployment rate, ∆UNEMPL, the differential of
the share of income taxes in GDP, TAX, and the differential of the share of private debt
in GDP, PRIV DEBT . This should permit us to examine whether large differences in past
fiscal deficits among two countries entail large present fiscal deficit differences among them
as well as whether similarities in business cycles lead to similar fiscal deficit patterns. We
further hypothesize that differences in fiscal deficits co-move with the exogenous variables.
Fiscal spending can be assumed to be influenced by the political ideology, with conservative
governments being more opposed to deficits, and by the political business cycle, with expendi-
tures increasing before elections. Differences in the two indicators between two countries thus
can be expected to result in divergent fiscal policies and differences in government deficits.
Institutional determinants of fiscal deficits have been previously investigated by Bayar and
Smeets (2009) and Agnello et al. (2013). High unemployment levels would increase the need
for social spendings and, hence, increase the deficit (Bayar and Smeets, 2009). Different
developments in unemployment should therefore result in differences of fiscal deficits. Sim-
ilarly, differences in tax revenues should increase differences in fiscal deficits. Differences in
inflation rates can result in differences of deficit accumulation rates and, as an outcome, in
divergence of the deficit differential. In summary, an increasing differential in these variables
would increase the deficit differential in the EA.
Equation (4) explains differences in government debt between country pairs, GOVDEBT ,
by developments in business cycles correlation, COR, and a set of exogenous variables, among
them the differences in average net lending over the past three years,
NETLEND_PAST3, in the government bond rate, BONDRATE, and in the share of
private debt in GDP, PRIV DEBT . We assume that the less synchronized business cycles
are between country pairs, the further away are their government debt levels. Countries in a
recession have higher expenditures and thus accumulate more debt (Sinha et al., 2011). Less
BCS should therefore increase debt differentials with low growth countries accumulating debt
and high growth countries decreasing debt. However, there might also be the possibility of a
positive relation between BCS and government debt. Due to differences in fiscal policy imple-
mentation styles among governments, countries with rather de-synchronized business cycles
can still experience similar debt levels. Or despite synchronized business cycles, countries
5Our variable is derived from primary fiscal deficits since this is the most direct measure of present fiscal
policy and thus clearly has to be preferred to government net lending which would include interest payments.
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might show very dissimilar debt levels because of different interest burdens. Big differences
in past fiscal deficits should lead to different levels of debt accumulation and thus high present
differences in public debt. Since high interest levels would further increase debt, differences
in long term government bond rates should result in higher differences in government debts.
Equation (5) refers to private debt and proposes that differences in the private debt level
arise from different business cycles, COR, from differences in past investment behavior, i.e.
differences in the average investment rate over the past 2 year INV_PAST2, and differences
in long-term interest rates, BONDRATE. When two countries show a similar investment
behaviour in the past, they are expected to have little differences in private debt accumulation.
Furthermore, when countries face similar long-term interest rates, they are also likely to show
similar patterns of private debt accumulation.
Equation (6) posits that differences in the change of real unit labor costs, ∆LUNIT , are
explained by business cycle correlation, COR, current account differentials, CA, and exoge-
nous variables, among them, the differential of the change in unemployment, ∆UNEMPL,
differences in the change of the terms of trade over the past 2 years, ∆TOT_L2, and dif-
ferences in the change of housing prices, HOUSEPRICE. We postulate a positive relation
between these variables. The position in the business cycle influences wage bargaining, with
real wages increasing during booms and dropping during recessions. Less BCS should there-
fore be accompanied by big differences in unit labor cost developments. Empirically, so far,
the pro-cyclicality of real wages has not been generally confirmed (see Messina et al., 2009).
Differences in the current account position in the EA indicate that countries are exposed to
a different extent to competitive pressure. Export-oriented countries might watch their unit
labor cost development more cautionary. Different unemployment levels in the EA would put
trade unions in a quite different wage bargaining position. With low/high unemployment,
changes in wages are supposed to be higher/lower (Dvorkin and Shell, 2015). Unemployment
differentials should thus entail different changes in unit labor costs. Differences in inflation-
ary development, captured by the housing prices and terms of trade should translate into
increasing wage differentials in the EA since an increase in the housing price or in import
prices would lead to higher wage demands.
As it is often unrealistic to expect the equation errors in our system to be uncorrelated, we
employ a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system approach proposed by Zellner (1962).
The SUR model is estimated using the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method,
which is essentially a two-step procedure; in the first step we estimate the parameters of our
system by ordinary least squares, and use the residuals obtained from this step to estimate
the disturbance terms’ variances and covariances in the second step.
4 Data
Our data set has a quarterly frequency (in some cases quarterly data is calculated from
monthly data). The sample covers 12 Euro Area countries.6 The time spans from 2002Q2 to
2012Q4. Additionally we use samples of 3 periods: the full sample which covers the whole
time span, the pre-crisis sample which covers the period before the Great Recession (2002Q2
- 2007Q4) and the crisis and post-crisis sample which refers to the years since the Great
Recession (2008Q1 - 2012Q4). This results in 66 bilateral pairs for each variable across 43
time periods in total.
As a measure of business cycle correlations we employ a method proposed by Engle
(2002) - the dynamic conditional correlation method.7 This model is from a class of multi-
6These are the 11 initial Euro members Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Greece which adopted the Euro in 2001
7We are indebted to Nikolaos Antonakakis for support in computing business cycle correlations.
11
variate Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models and it
is capable of estimating large time-varying covariance matrices (Engle and Sheppard, 2001).
It combines the flexibility of GARCH models (the correlation matrix is time-varying) but is
easy to estimate using a 2-step procedure.
As an input we take monthly data of the industrial production index (IPI). Let us suppose
that the demeaned IPI is normally distributed with covariance matrix Ht or
IPIt ∼ N(0, Ht)
and
Ht = DtRtDt
where Dt is the k by k diagonal matrix of time varying standard deviations from univariate
GARCH models with
√
hit on the ith diagonal, and Rt is the time-varying correlation matrix
(Engle and Sheppard, 2001).
Elements of Dt are assumed to follow a univariate GARCH(p,q) model process so that:
hit = ωi +
Pi∑
p=1
αipIPI
2
it−p +
Q−i∑
q=1
βiqhit−p (7)
with i1,..k, i is running from 1 to k.
The resulting dynamic conditional correlation structure is the following:
Qt = (1−
M∑
m=1
αm −
N∑
n=1
βn)Q¯+
M∑
m=1
αm(t−m′t−m) +
N∑
n=1
βnQt−n (8)
Rt = Q∗−1t QtQ∗−1t , (9)
where R is time-varying correlation matrix, t = D−1t IPIt , Q¯ is the unconditional co-
variance of the standardized residuals from the first estimation step and
Q∗t =

√
q11 0 . . . 0
0 √q22 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . √qkk

is a diagonal matrix with square root of elements of Qt on its diagonal. In this way the
correlation matrix Rt is composed of elements of the form: ρijt = qijt√qiitqjjt .
Importantly, this method accounts for short-term developments in our monthly data of
the industrial production index used to calculate business cycle correlations.
The definition of variables of the complete data set, how it is calculated, its input indicator
and the sources of it are given in Table I in the Appendix.
The time series for explanatory variables undergo a two-step transformation. In the first
step, in order to make valid conclusions when comparing performances of macroeconomic
indicators across EA countries all initial data series are transformed as:
- a percentage of a country’s GDP level to account for differences in the countries’ size
and population, e.g. CONSUMit = Consumption expenditures of country i at time tGDP of country i at time t , or
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- a year to year change (in case of indexes), e.g. ∆LUNITit = (LUNITit/LUNITit−4 −
1) ∗ 100.
The political ideology and political business cycle variables are taken without transformation
in days/quarters respectively. A description of each constructed variable is presented in Table
I.
As a second step we construct bilateral coefficients by using the log of the absolute dif-
ference between country pairs. The resulting variables are of the form:
V ARijt = log | V ARit − V ARjt |
In this way we only consider mutual dynamics of variables between a country pair. When
there is no difference of values between countries (or this difference is negligibly small) we
assign a zero value to such observation.
Lastly, we apply a 5-periods overlapping rolling windows transformation on the final
variables. We construct an average over two preceding observations, current position of the
variable and its two periods ahead values. In this way we lose only few observations and it
helps to smooth overly fluctuations arising sometimes from different seasonality patterns in
countries.
To sum up, one has to remember that the variables are constructed as differentials between
countries. In this respect a positive effect of variable 1 on variable 2 means that the further
away are the observations underlying variable 1 between two countries (large absolute value of
their differential) the higher is the differential expressed in variable 2. For example, a positive
coefficient of the variable UNEMPL in the GOVDEF equation would mean, the more
unequal are changes in unemployment, the more different is the government deficit between
two countries. In contrast, a negative effect of variable 1 on variable 2 means, the higher is
the difference of the indicator underlying variable 1 between the two countries, the lower is
the difference expressed in variable 2. For example, a negative coefficient of GOVDEF in
the COR equation would mean that big differences in government deficit between a country
pair result in a low correlation of business cycles.
5 Results
The results of our estimations are presented in Table 1. The table reports the estimations
for the full sample period 2002Q2-2012Q4 and separately for the pre-crisis period 2002Q2-
2007Q4 and for the crisis/post-crisis period 2008Q1-2012Q4 to which we refer as "post-crisis
period". For the post-crisis period, a second estimation has been performed including private
debt (for which no complete time series is available for the first period).
In all samples, differences in CA balance, in the change in unit labor cost and in fiscal
deficit show a negative relationship with BCS. Differences in government debt reveal a neg-
ative relation with BCS in the pre-crisis period, but a positive in the post-crisis period and
over the whole sample period. Differences in private debt show a negative relation with BCS.
The estimations show a high explanatory power –– which is equally found in the auxiliary
estimated equations of the system –– with an R2 of 0.73-0.79.
Differences in primary government deficits, i.e. differences in fiscal policy, have an im-
mediate decoupling effect on BC. This effect is almost twice as high in the post-crisis period
than in the pre-crisis period. In contrast, the consequence of government debt on BCS is not
consistent. In the pre-crisis period, where the estimates reveal a negative effect, we are in a
period when some countries accumulated debt more quickly than others due to persistent ex-
pansionary policies. Those permitted higher growth in these countries with the consequence
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Table 1: Estimation results
Full sample Pre-crisis Post-crisis Post-crisis
incl. PRIVDEBT
COR equation
CA −0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0138∗∗∗ −0.0221∗∗∗ −0.0219∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0026) (0.0027)
GOVDEF −0.0215∗∗∗ −0.0138∗∗∗ −0.0238∗∗∗ −0.0169∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0028)
GOVDEBT 0.0135∗∗∗ −0.0429∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0023) (0.0024)
PRIV DEBT −0.0106∗∗∗
(0.0011)
∆LUNIT −0.0247∗∗∗ −0.0129∗∗∗ −0.0238∗∗∗ −0.0190∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0025)
R2 0.7512 0.7988 0.7351 0.7432
CA equation
COR −0.3960∗∗∗ −0.2580 −1.1005∗∗∗ −1.0221∗∗∗
(0.1248) (0.1569) (0.1274) (0.1318)
GOVDEF 0.0035 0.0389∗ 0.0001 −0.0213
(0.0180) (0.0236) (0.0185) (0.0192)
∆LUNIT −0.0491∗∗∗ 0.1945∗∗∗ −0.2067∗∗∗ −0.2608∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0182) (0.0162) (0.0165)
∆EXRATE 0.0749∗∗∗ 0.0270∗ 0.0642∗∗∗ 0.0961∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0151) (0.0139) (0.0145)
CONSTR 0.0733∗∗∗ 0.1234∗∗∗ 0.0511∗∗∗ 0.0349∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0240) (0.0150) (0.0145)
CONSUM 0.2615∗∗∗ 0.1011∗∗∗ 0.3116∗∗∗ 0.2928∗∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0375) (0.0226) (0.0234)
R2 0.7044 0.8115 0.6413 0.6570
GOVDEF equation
GOVDEF_PAST1 0.2108∗∗∗ 0.1016∗∗∗ 0.2068∗∗∗ 0.2011∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0159) (0.0099) (0.0104)
COR −0.9777∗∗∗ −0.8804∗∗∗ −1.0642∗∗∗ −0.6836∗∗∗
(0.1211) (0.1669) (0.1144) (0.1206)
POL_IDEO 0.0137 0.0477∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗ 0.0056
(0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0101) (0.0106)
POL_BC −0.0005 0.0252∗ −0.0102 −0.0221∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0151) (0.0090) (0.0093)
INFL 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗ 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.1096∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0176) (0.0125) (0.0132)
∆UNEMPL 0.0644∗∗∗ 0.0833∗∗∗ 0.0588∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0157) (0.0111) (0.0119)
TAX 0.1079∗∗∗ 0.1776∗∗∗ 0.1059∗∗∗ 0.1007∗∗∗
(0.0239) (0.0293) (0.0226) (0.0237)
PRIV DEBT 0.0386∗∗∗
(0.0074)
R2 0.5466 0.6027 0.5226 0.5449
GOVDEBT equation
COR 0.7477∗∗∗ −1.6963∗∗∗ 0.5360∗∗∗ 0.9382∗∗∗
(0.1429) (0.1486) (0.1444) (0.1537)
NETLEND_PAST3 0.0713∗∗∗ 0.1339∗∗∗ 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0191) (0.0153) (0.0159)
BONDRATE 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0129) (0.0106) (0.0110)
PRIV DEBT −0.0221∗∗∗
(0.0091)
R2 0.7595 0.9064 0.7114 0.7117
PRIVDEBT equation
COR −3.1352∗∗∗
(0.3219)
BONDRATE 0.1727∗∗∗
(0.0227)
INV_PAST2 0.1161∗∗∗
(0.0375)
R2 0.6796
∆ LUNIT equation
COR −1.4555∗∗∗ −1.0558∗∗∗ −1.5279∗∗∗ −1.4234∗∗∗
(0.1463) (0.2178) (0.1426) (0.1509)
CA −0.0737∗∗∗ 0.3900∗∗∗ −0.2573∗∗∗ −0.3292∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0359) (0.0200) (0.0211)
∆UNEMPL 0.0566∗∗∗ 0.0023 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0206) (0.0137) (0.0144)
∆TOT_L2 0.0333∗∗ 0.0769∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0253)
∆HOUSEPRICE 0.0074 0.0486∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0164) (0.0172)
R2 0.5001 0.4766 0.4739 0.477
All estimations with country pair specific and time specific effects
* p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
of a desynchronization of BC. In the post-crisis period where the coefficient of debt becomes
positive, EA countries have entered a period where debt levels in all countries had risen,
although to a different extent, and practically all countries where violating the Maastricht
public debt criteria. Consequently, EA countries where simultaneously consolidating their
budgets. Growth in all countries was dampened. Therefore we find a positive coefficient
in the case of these mounting debt differences on BCS.8 Our result confirms the findings of
Caporale and Girardi (2013).
In summary, before a certain debt threshold, higher debts bring countries on a higher
growth track and result in BC decoupling. When debt levels become unsustainable, a con-
certed effort of fiscal adjustment would not reduce BCS.
The negative effect of differences of current account balances, which have prevailed at
most dates in the 2000s across EA members, plays an equally high negative role for BCS as
divergent fiscal policies. In the post-crisis period this negative effect becomes even higher.
We consider this as an evidence that differences in export performance across EA members
lead to a different growth development and produce a decoupling of BC.
Divergent developments in real unit labor costs are an important factor behind BC decou-
pling which - again - has become even more important in the post-crisis period. We interpret
this as evidence that different wage developments primarily produce demand effects. Exces-
sive increases in real wages would surge output while declining wages cut demand and result
in output losses. This result is in line with the recent findings of Gächter et al. (2016).
Finally, the estimates indicate that different rates of private debt in EA countries reduce
BCS. The big differences that have built up during the credit boom in the periphery countries
have remained until 2010. We find our hypothesis of decoupling effects on BC of private debt
differences confirmed and ascribe this effect to the substantial demand and output effects
that have resulted from the credit boom in the periphery. As countries with high private
debt levels were seriously hit by the financial crisis, they watched a more substantial decline
in demand and output in the Great Crisis than the less indebted countries.
Besides these direct effects of differences in current account balances, in fiscal policy, in
debt and in unit labor cost developments on BCS, our estimates show also (i) how these factors
affect indirectly BCS via another endogenous variable, and furthermore, (ii) the estimates
indicate a number of other factors which determine the key explanatory variables. Both is
captured in the auxiliary equation of COR, GOVDEF , GOVDEBT , PRIV DEBT and
∆LUNIT .
In the auxiliary equation explaining CA differences, we find a significant negative co-
efficient of output correlation, COR, and significant positive coefficients for differences in
exchange rate developments, differences in unit labor cost developments (only pre-crisis pe-
riod), different shares of the construction sector and different consumption propensity, and
different government deficits (in the pre-crisis period).
The estimates indicate that CA differences in the EA are determined by different de-
velopments in competitiveness, resulting from the uneven development of the real effective
exchange rate –– which can be largely attributed to different inflation development since for
intra-EU trade the nominal exchange rate is the same for all EA members –– and of unit
labor costs. Different developments of unit labor costs are, however, only responsible for
spreads in CA balances in the pre-crisis period. The positive coefficient in the post-crisis
sample suggests that the reduction of unit labor cost differentials in the immediate crisis
period could not prevent an increase in CA differences in the Eurozone. The decrease in
the unit labor cost differential per se did not result in smaller current account differences
among member states. Lower unit labor costs need to be passed to price reductions –– as the
8Similarly, Cecchetti et al. (2011) finds that the growth effect of government debts turns from positive into
negative after a certain threshold is reached.
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positive real exchange rate coefficient shows –– in order to improve the current account. The
estimation of the current account equation nicely shows how the scoreboard indicators are
interrelated. Our estimates provide evidence that the indicators wage and price development
are important for explaining the current account position. A more uniform development of
wages and inflation rates would assure that disparities in the current account balance between
EA members diminish.
The different size of the construction sector in the EA generates differences in CA.
Economies with a large construction sector depend more heavily on imports and show a
lower share of export industries.
Differences in consumption propensity in the EA, which for example is much higher in
Southern EA countries such as Greece and Portugal, lead to CA differences.
Differences in government deficits among EA members contributed to current account
differences in the pre-crisis period which would indicate that government deficits were exter-
nally financed in that period. As the coefficient loses significance in the post-crisis period
this would indicate that deficits were financed from domestic savings.
Finally there is a significant endogeneity between output correlation and CA differences.
An increase in BCS would help to reduce CA differences in the EA.
In summary, more equal price developments, consumption shares and economic structures
would help to reduce CA differences that are prohibitive for BCS. The same can be partly
said for the impact of public deficit and unit labor costs.
In the auxiliary equation explaining differences in primary government deficit, GOVDEF ,
we find a significant negative coefficient of output correlation, a significant positive coefficient
of differences in the average government deficit in the past 3 years, in inflation, in changes
in unemployment and in the income tax to GDP ratio. There is also a positive coefficient
of differences in political ideology in both sub samples, but not for the full sample in this
specification.9 Differences in the political business cycle also have a significantly positive
coefficient in the pre-crisis period, but not in the other samples. Furthermore, private debt
shows a significantly positive coefficient in the post-crisis period.
The estimations suggest that differences in government deficits appear as a response to
different BCS. Thus we find an endogeneity between government deficit development and
BCS in the EA. More similar fiscal policies promote BCS in the EA, but more BCS would
also serve to achieve more similar budgetary positions in the EU. Differences in fiscal deficits
are persistent. Countries showing differences in fiscal policies in the past will continue to
do so since fiscal policy instruments cannot be changed instantly. For example, it would be
practically impossible for a government to get parliamentary consent to cut all existing social
transfers. The response of fiscal policy differences to inflation differentials shows that fiscal
policies are further highly pro-cyclical. During an individual boom, a country will therefore
increase its differential in fiscal policy. Also do differences in the development of unemploy-
ment trigger differences in government deficits since countries would face a different load of
unemployment benefit payments. Different tax shares among EA members or across time
lead to differences in fiscal deficits. Since our data shows that differences in unemployment
and in income tax rates are highly correlated with per capita income differences in the EA,
differences in fiscal policies are also a matter of income disparities across the EA. There is
also an institutional factor behind the different development of public deficits. Differences
in fiscal policy rise when EA governments show very opposite ideologies. The positive coef-
ficient of POL_BC in the pre-crisis period suggests that differences in government deficit
were related to differences in the political business cycle of governments in that period. In
the post-crisis period, however, the coefficient becomes negative suggesting that differences
9When the specification of the GOVDEF equation is slightly changed the coefficient of POL_IDEO is
also significantly positive in the full period.
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in government deficits had decreased despite different political business cycles. The role of
the institutional factor for government deficits in the EA has not been found so clearly in the
previous literature (Bayar and Smeets, 2009). Finally, the positive coefficient of private debt
in the post-crisis period indicates that mounting differences in government deficits are also a
consequence of differences in the private debt level in the EA. An interpretation can be that
a high level of private debt can result in financial problems of banks which the government
has to save from bankruptcy.
In the auxiliary equation explaining government debt, GOVDEBT , we find a positive
relationship between government debt and BCS over the full sample period and in the post-
crisis period,10 but a negative in the pre-crisis period. This provides econometric evidence
confirming the statistical patterns in our data (see Section 2). First, the increase in public
debt differentials built up in the boom period, unequally strong in EA members and thus
resulting in lower BCS, when several EA governments in the core but also in the periphery
(Ireland and Spain) could reduce their debt while in others, notably in Greece and in Portugal
public debt constantly increased. Then, during the crisis which hit all EA members and thus
lead to higher BCS, debt differentials surprisingly increased further. The positive coefficient
with growth correlation in this period could be the result of a different response of tax
receipts and expenditures to output decline, or the result of increasingly high burdens of
interest payments in highly indebted EA countries.
One has to conclude that, unlike the positive effect of BCS on government deficit differen-
tials, differences in public debt across EA members are not automatically reduced by enforced
BCS. The estimates suggest that other factors can clearly explain the mounting public debt
differences and have become more important in the post-crisis period. First, past differences
in government net lending, i.e. primary deficits plus interest payments, show a positive co-
efficient in all samples and thus determine the differences in accumulated debt. Second, we
find a significant positive relation of debt differences with differences in government bond
rates which reflect the risk rating of a country and its credit costs. Thus differences in credit
costs have resulted in important differences of accumulated public debt in the EA. Finally, in
the post-crisis period for which we have data on private debt, we find a significant negative
coefficient of private debt on public debt which can be interpreted as a substitution between
the two. Due to the takeover of private debt by governments, while private debt differentials
decreased government debt differentials increased.
The auxiliary equation on private debt, PRIV DEBT , shows a statistically significant
negative coefficient of business cycle correlation and a positive of differences in government
bond rates and in investment. Thus evidently, the different accumulation of private debt in the
EA appears as a consequence of different output growth and different investment behaviour.
They are, however, also a consequence of different interest rates, proxied by government
bond rates. Higher credit costs increase private debt. As with public debt, credit risk which
increases with mounting indebtedness propels interest rate payments upward and worsens
indebtedness further.
In the auxiliary equation of differences in unit labor cost developments, ∆LUNIT , our
estimates identify a robust positive relation with differences in the terms of trade –– a general
indicator for inflationary developments –– and unemployment. The positive coefficient of
housing price differences proposes that wage developments in the EA were also driven by
different price developments in the housing market. Further the significant negative coefficient
with output correlation suggests that labor cost differentials appear between economies in
a different business cycle. The positive coefficient with unemployment differentials points
10This result is similar to the findings of Panizza and Presbitera (2014) who study the relationship between
economic growth and government debt and find that once they control for endogeneity the negative link
between growth and debt disappears.
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into the same direction. Diverging wage developments appear due to different output growth
and corresponding labor market differences. In high growth countries higher wage bargains
would be agreed than in low growth countries. Furthermore, we find a significant negative
coefficient of CA differences –– except for the pre-crisis period. An interpretation of the
positive coefficient can be that in case of large current account differences, the country with
a surplus would pursue narrow wage increases to ensure competitiveness while in the country
with a current account deficit labor would demand higher wages to balance higher import
prices. Increasing current account differences would then be followed by increasing spread of
labor unit costs. The appearing negative relation in the post-crisis period could mean that
in a situation of big current account differences the surplus countries might have seized to
moderate in wage development while the deficit countries finally attempt to limit wage claims
to restore competitiveness.
In summary, our estimations have shown that the scoreboard indicators produce clear
direct and indirect effects on BCS in the EA. Figure 7 summarizes how current account
imbalances, differences in fiscal policies, in public and private debt and in unit labor cost
developments affect BCS in the EA, either directly or indirectly through the other factor.
Figure 7: Summary of estimation results:
Direct and indirect effects of scoreboard indicators on BCS
GOVDEF differences
CA differences
GOVDEBT differences
BSC
∆LUNIT differences
PRIVDEBT differences
∆HOUSEPRICE differences ∆UNEMPL differences
+ +
+
+
+
+(-)
+(-)
--
-
-
-
-
-(+)
-(+)
--
+/- positive/negative effect is present in all samples
+(-) positive effect in pre-crisis period, but turns negative post-crisis
-(+) negative effect in pre-crisis period, but turns positive post-crisis
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Since 2011, the European Commission constantly observes the scoreboard indicators under its
aim of surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. These indicators comprise: the government
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deficit, private and public debt, the current account balance, unit labor costs, unemployment,
inflation, housing prices and the real effective exchange rate. This paper aimed to explore
the impact of the scoreboard indicators on business cycle synchronization in the EA. Using
a simultaneous equations model, we estimated how differences in the key indicators between
EA members affect BCS among them. Thus the direct effect of differences in fiscal policies,
in public and private debt, in current account balances and in unit labor cost developments
on BCS was estimated. As a measure for BCS we used the dynamic conditional correlation
of Engle (2002), recently proposed in the literature of the field. Our model specification
permitted us not only to show the direct effects of the indicators just named, but also how
these key scoreboard indicators act, together with other scoreboard indicators, on each other
and thus produce indirect effects on BCS.
Our results offer clear evidence that the surveillance of these indicators is essential to
assure BCS, which is of outmost importance for the European Monetary Union.
First, our study shows that differences in the current account balance between EA mem-
bers produce a decoupling effect on BCS that has even grown in the post-crisis period. As
significant differences in export rates are a major reason for different current account bal-
ances, EA members and the European Commission have to watch with concern that EA
members develop an equal export performance. We found that competition factors, such
as labor costs and real exchange rate differences are a major factor behind current account
differences. Under this aspect the concern given in the macroeconomic imbalances procedure
to observe inflation and wage development, is fully justified as it would help to keep current
account balances of EA members more similar –– the co-existence of export champions and
hardly export oriented countries in the EA would lessen –– which in turn would promote
BCS.
Second, this study provides clear results that different fiscal policies or growing differen-
tials in public debt among EA members produce immediate de-synchronization of business
cycles in the EA. Divergent fiscal policies produce differences in output growth, so that the
common monetary policy will hardly be suitable for all members. A rigourous control to
stay within fiscal deficit thresholds under the straightjacket of the Maastricht Treaty and its
enforcement by the macroeconomic imbalances procedure has to be judged as an important
instrument to keep fiscal policies of EA members similar and provide for a well functioning
EMU. However, fiscal discipline under tightly monitored common rules would also be easier
with more BCS. There exists endogeneity between fiscal policy and BCS. More BCS should
also reduce unemployment and inflation differentials in the EA which are an important reason
for differences in government deficits. In addition, if policy makers subscribe commonly to
the goal of enforcing labor market flexibility, this would serve to reduce unequal labor market
developments in the EA and help to reduce differences in government budgetary positions.
It further appears that fiscal policy disparities in the EA show a persistence. Efforts to align
fiscal deficits to the thresholds imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact will only show
noticeable results after a few years. Another important fact arises in this study. Political ide-
ology as well as the wish for opportunistic behaviour in view of elections are factors explaining
differences in government deficits. The style of fiscal policy is strongly affected by different
ideologies which impose more or less interventions of the state. Consequently, the struggle
to constrain EA countries’ fiscal policy behavior by a common threshold is a challenge that
requires a narrowing of political perceptions by EA members.
Third, concerning the mounting difference in public debt that has appeared in the EA
in the 2000s, we find no clear evidence how this influences BCS. When debt differences have
built up in the pre-crisis period this seems to have resulted in different growth records during
the boom period. But continued differences in public debt across the EA did not weaken
BCS which dominated in the crisis period as all countries where simultaneously affected
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by the crisis. This should be seen as evidence that the early debt differences in the EA
have resulted in unequal output growth, while with mounting un-sustainability of debt all
countries suffer from reduced growth. Consequently, clear limits for public debt in the EA
are highly important. The results suggest that public debt differentials in turn will continue
to appear in the EA without strict common fiscal rules concerning current budget deficits.
Furthermore, we find support that debt problems in the EA are highly linked to different
financing costs of the sovereign which reflect different risk ratings of countries. Since the risk
ranking deteriorates with the accumulated level of private and public debt this is another
reason why it is important that the macroeconomic imbalances procedure monitors the public
debt level.
Fourth, the estimates also show that the important differences in private debt between
EA members have produced decoupling effects on BCS. First, the different accumulation of
private debt, particularly in the periphery, produced unequal growth rates during the boom,
then the different private debt level led to a much deeper recession in countries with high
private debt. However, the relation between private debt and BCS is a two-way. Differences
in private debt across the EA are also caused by different levels of output growth. Thus we
also find an endogeneity between BCS and differences in private debt levels. Because of the
negative effect of private debt differences for BCS it is important that the level of private debt
is observed under the macroeconomic imbalances procedure. Furthermore, as we have found
that private debt differences, equally as public debt differences, rise with interest differences,
the emergence of interest differences also has to be monitored under the macroeconomic
imbalances procedure.
Fifth, our estimations show that divergent real wage developments between EA mem-
bers lead also directly to a decoupling of BC due to demand effects. The important wage
increases in the peripheral member states in the boom years, or wage cuts in some member
states required later by budgetary consolidation, would produce such demand effects and re-
sult in reduced BCS. Different unit labor cost developments in the EA in turn are generated
by differences in output and unemployment development and different price developments.
Again we find that the relationship between changes in real unit labor cost differentials and
BCS runs in both directions. A monitoring of unit labor cost developments will be an im-
portant factor to assure BCS. Observing the development of wages under the macroeconomic
imbalances procedure is thus a reasonable concern.
In summary, this study provides convincing evidence that a close monitoring of the in-
dicators addressed by the scoreboard indicators is a necessity to guarantee BCS in the EA
which is the most important condition to assure a smooth and beneficial working of the mon-
etary union. Observing the development of the scoreboard indicators definitely will not be
enough. The uniformly required development in the areas of the scoreboard indicators across
EA members will only be possible by establishing the institutional framework for a common
economic government at the EA level.
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Appendix
Table I: Data sources and definition of variables
Variable name Variable definition Indicator usedas input
Definition input
indicator Source
BONDRATE Differential of government
bond rate between country i
and country j: log of absolute
difference of government bond
rates
Government bond
rate, in %
Harmonized long-term (10
year) interest rates for gov-
ernment bonds
ECB
CA Current account balance dif-
ferential between country i an
j: log of absolute difference of
current account as a % of GDP
Current account
balance in % GDP
net exports goods and
services, net income from
abroad and net current
transfers
Eurostat
CONSTR Differential construction sector
share between country i and
j: log of absolute difference of
construction share
Construction sec-
tor in % of total
gross value added
Gross value added construc-
tion sector
Eurostat
CONSUM Differential consumption
propensity between country i
and j: log of absolute differ-
ence of consumption in % of
GDP
Consumption in %
of GDP
Consumption expenditures of
households, non-profit insti-
tutions serving households
and governments on goods
and services, not seasonally
adjusted
calculated
from data
Eurostat
COR Dynamic conditional correla-
tion of IPI between country i
and j, Engle’s measure
Growth industrial
production index
(IPI)
Monthly changes in the price-
adjusted output of industry
Calculated
from data
IMF
GOVDEBT Government debt differential
between country i and j: log
of absolute difference of gov-
ernment debt in % GDP
Government debt
in % GDP
General gross consolidated
debt
Eurostat
GOVDEF Primary deficit differential be-
tween country i and j: log of
absolute difference of primary
deficit in % GDP
Primary deficit in
% GDP
General government receipts
minus expenditures exclud-
ing debt interest payments,
not seasonally adjusted
ECB
GOVDEF_
PAST1
Average primary deficit differ-
ential between country i and
j in previous year: log of
absolute difference of primary
deficit in % GDP
Primary deficit in
% GDP, average
over previous year
General government receipts
minus expenditures exclud-
ing debt interest payments,
not seasonally adjusted
calculated
from data
ECB
∆EXRATE Differential of change in real ef-
fective exchange rate between
country i and j: log of absolute
difference of change in real ef-
fective exchange rate index
Real effective ex-
change rate, y-o-y
change
Real effective exchange rate
index (2005=100) vis-à-vis
42 trading partners (EU27,
EA, EU Member States,
Turkey, Norway, Switzer-
land, Canada, United States,
Mexico, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand, Brazil, China,
South Korea, Hong Kong,
Russia)
Calculated
from data
Eurostat
∆HOUSE
PRICE
Differential housing prices
change between country i and
j: log of absolute difference of
change in housing prices
HCPI housing,
y-o-y change
Change harmonized
consumer price index
(2005=100) for housing
rental, maintenance and re-
pair of dwellings, services to
dwellings (water, electricity,
gas)
Calculated
from data
Eurostat
INFL Inflation differential between
country i and j: log of absolute
difference of inflation
HCPI,
y-o-y change
Harmonized consumer price
index (HCPI), all goods,
2005=100
Eurostat
INV_PAST2 Differential investment rate be-
tween country i and j: log of
absolute difference of invest-
ment rate
Investment rate in
% GDP, average
over past 2 years
Gross fixed capital formation,
not seasonally adjusted
Calculated
from data
Eurostat
∆LUNIT Differential of change in unit
labor cost between country i
and j: log of absolute difference
of change in unit labor costs
Real unit labor
costs, y-o-y change
Change of index (2005=100)
compensation per employee
in current prices divided by
GDP in current prices per to-
tal employment, not season-
ally adjusted
Calculated
from data
Eurostat
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Table I continued
Variable name Variable definition Indicator usedas input
Definition input
indicator Source
NETLEND_
PAST3
Net lending differential be-
tween country i an j: log of ab-
solute difference of net lending
Government net
lending in % GDP,
average over past 3
years
General government receipts
minus expenditures, not sea-
sonally adjusted
Calculated
from data
Eurostat
POLBC Political business cycle differ-
ential between country i and
j: log of absolute difference of
number of quarters before elec-
tion
Political business
cycle
Number of quarters before
next parlamentary elections
EED
POLIDEO Political ideology differential
between country i and j: log of
absolute difference of political
ideology index
Political ideology
index
The ideological complexion of
government and parliament
index multiplied by the num-
ber of days a parliament is al-
ready in power
Seki and
Williams
(2013)
PRIV DEBT Private debt differential be-
tween country i and j: log of
absolute difference of private
debt in % GDP
Private sector debt
in % GDP
(Stock of loans to house-
holds + non profit organisa-
tions serving HH) + (stock of
loans to non financial organi-
zations) + (stock of loans to
MFIs)
Calculated
from data
ECB
TAX Income tax share differential
between country i and j: log
of absolute difference of income
tax in % of GDP
Income tax, in % of
GDP
Current tax on income receiv-
able
Eurostat
∆TOT_L2
Terms of trade differential be-
tween country i and j: log abso-
lute difference of terms of trade
change
Terms of trade,
change with re-
spect to 2 years
back
Exports over imports as price
indices
Calculated
from data
Eurostat
∆UNEMPL Differential of change in unem-
ployment rate between country
i and j: absolute difference of
log change unemployment
Unemployment
rate, y-o-y change
Change in unemployment
rate
calculated
from data
Eurostat
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